Phone, Computer, and Digital Search Warrants in Minnesota

Your Phone: Police Generally Need a Warrant

In Riley v. California (2014), the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that police generally must obtain a warrant before searching the digital contents of a cell phone — even one seized during a lawful arrest. The Court recognized that a modern phone holds an enormous amount of private information, nothing like the contents of a pocket or wallet.

• Officers can physically secure your phone and inspect the device itself (for example, to ensure it's not concealing a weapon).
• They generally cannot search your data — texts, emails, photos, apps, browsing history, location history — without a warrant.

(Narrow exceptions, such as a genuine emergency, can still apply.)

Your Location History: Carpenter and Cell-Site Data

In Carpenter v. United States (2018), the Supreme Court held that the government generally needs a warrant to obtain historical cell-site location information — the records from your carrier that can reconstruct where your phone (and you) have been over time. The Court held that the "third-party doctrine" — the idea that you lose privacy in information held by a company — does not automatically apply to this kind of detailed, pervasive location tracking.

What this means for you: Detailed location data that places you somewhere over days or weeks is protected. If the government obtained your location history without a warrant, that may be challengeable.

Computers, Email, and Cloud Data

Searches of computers and electronically stored information are also subject to full constitutional protection — probable cause, a particular description, and the oath requirement all apply. Minnesota also has a specific statute (Minn. Stat. § 626.18) governing warrants for records held by providers of electronic communication services and remote computing services — covering things like:

• the identity of customers using a service;
• data stored by or for the customer;
• usage records;
• the recipients of communications; and
• the content of communications.

Such warrants generally require production within a set number of business days (with provisions for emergencies and for extensions), and a provider can move to quash. Because these searches can sweep in intensely personal information — and often protected speech — courts give particularity and scope especially careful scrutiny.

The Particularity Problem in Digital Searches

Digital devices raise a special concern: a phone or computer holds vast amounts of information unrelated to any crime. A warrant to search a device for evidence of one offense isn't a license to comb through everything. Challenges often focus on whether the warrant was sufficiently particular, whether the search exceeded its authorized scope, and whether police had a real nexus between the suspected crime and the data they searched.

Other Emerging Areas

The law continues to evolve with technology. Minnesota has, for example, enacted a statute addressing law enforcement use of drones (unmanned aerial vehicles), generally requiring a warrant for many uses with specific exceptions. As surveillance technology advances, these rules are an active and developing area.

How Digital Searches Get Challenged

• Warrantless phone search — police searched your device's data without a warrant (a Riley issue);
• Warrantless location tracking — historical cell-site or location data obtained without a warrant (a Carpenter issue);
• Overbroad warrant — a general license to search an entire device;
• Scope violation — searching data beyond what the warrant authorized;
• No nexus — no real connection between the crime and the data searched.

Because digital evidence is so often central to a modern case, a successful challenge can dramatically change the outcome.

Key Terms

• Riley rule: Police generally need a warrant to search a cell phone's data.
• Cell-site location information (CSLI): Carrier records of a phone's location over time.
• Carpenter rule: A warrant is generally required for historical location data.
• Third-party doctrine: The idea that data shared with a company loses protection — limited by Carpenter.
• Particularity: The requirement that a digital warrant be specific, not a general search.